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NOTES AND COMMENTS
AN AGENCY THEORY OF MECHANICS LIENS-In a recent North
Carolina case,' a husband entered into a contract with his wife to
build a theater on her own land. The wife paid the husband the full
amount in advance. The plaintiff furnished materials to the husband
for the building of the theater and brought suit to subject the wife's
land to a lien for the amount due from the husband for the
materials furnished.
If a lien for labor done and for materials furnished is to exist
against an owner of land, it is clear that the lien claimant must
conform to the provisions of the statute of the state where the
land is.
"There is a great diversity of provisions in the statutes.
No two states are alike. . . . There are to be found in them
several distinct plans or theories. Yet, as substantially the same
'Rose v. Davis (1924) 188 N. C. 355; 124 S.E. 576.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
end is sought in all of them and substantially the same constitutional
and legal limitations apply everywhere, the statutes agree in substance in their more important features, though these may be stated
differently." 2
Ordinarily, a mechanic's lien is said to attach when the owner
(1) contracts with a contractor to build on or to improve his land,
or (2) consents to the contractor's making such improvements.3
When materials or labor are furnished to the principal contractor,
the person furnishing them is generally regarded by the statutes as
a sub-contractor 4 and the principal contractor as the agent of the
owner for the purpose of establishing privity between the owner and
the sub-contractor. The lien being a creature of the statute and not
of contract, 5 furnishing materials to the principal contratcor is in
effect furnishing them to the agent of the owner and is sufficient to
establish a privity for the purpose of the lien.
It is well settled in North Carolina that the basis for a mechanic's
lien is the relation of creditor and debtor between the owner and
the person furnishing, labor or materials. 6 When this relation is
established then the claimant may have a lien for the amount of
the debt. Judge Allen delivering the opinion of the North Carolina
Court said: "The lien for labor done and materials furnished is
given by statute to enforce the payment of a debt and the general
principle underlying the lien laws is that the relation of debtor and
'
creditor must exist and that there can be no lien without a debt."T
At this point, it may be well to consider in a general way what
gives rise to the relation of creditor and debtor between the owner
and the material man. Where the principal contractor has (1) a
contract with the owner to improve his land, or (2) where the
owner has consented to such improvements, and, in either case, a
material man furnishes materials to the principal contractor, upon
the latter's default in paying for the materials, the material-man "is
substituted to the rights of the contractor" to the extent of his
claim.8
'Jones, Liens, Vol. II, par. 1186.
'Brick Co. v. Pulley (1915) 168 N. C. 371, 84 S. E. 357.
'C. S., see. 2437.
'Beach v. Huntsnan (1908) 42 Ind. App. 205, 85 N. E. 523.
'Boone v. Chalfield (1895) 118 N. C. 916, 24 S. E. 730; Weathers v. Borders
(1899) 124 N. C. 610, 32 §. E. 881; Foundry Co. v. Aluminum Co. (1916) 172
N. C. 704, 90 S." E. 923.

7172 N. C. 704, 705.
"Brick Co. v. Pulley (1915) 168 N. C. 371, 375, 84 S. E. 357.
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It is clear that the lien does not attach by reason of the owner's
contract or consent to the imposition of the lien. It seems that the
essence of an arrangement between an owner and a contractor for
building or making repairs on his land is that the contractor is
obliged, or intended, to deal with sub-contractors in doing the work
and securing materials. Therefore it seems to be correct to say
that the principal contractor is the agent of the owner for the purpose of creating valid debts to which the various mechanics' lien
laws attach liens. As long as there is a principal-agent relationship
between the owner and the contractor, then the contractor may, by
dealing with a subcontractor for work or materials, create a debtorcreditor relation between owner and subcontractor, and hence a lien
may arise. This is true although the owner may prohibit dealings
with a particular subcontractor or may limit the scope of the contractor's authority.9 What the cases mean to say is not that the
owner, by contract or consent to the imposition of the lien, is liable
to the lien, but that by contract or consent creates an agency, and
the agent may, under certain circumstances as to notice and other
statutory requisites, and acting within the apparent scope of his
authority, create a debt, and thus enable the subcontractor to impose
a lien on the principal's property.
"The right to a lien is confined to work, labor and materials
required by the principal contractor. To that extent, by force of the
statute, the owner makes the principal contractor his agent to bind
his property, but no further."' 0 "The statute itself has established
a direct contractual relation between the material man and the
owner; so that furnishing materials to the contractor is in effect
furnishing them to the owner . . . since the principal contractor is agent of the owner for the purpose of the statute.""
In the ordinary case, where the owner and contractor are both
sui jmris, if a contractor has an express or implied contract with the
owner of property to improve or build on it, a subcontractor may,
by working for or furnishing materials to the contractor, subject
the owner's property to a lien for his claim. This is only in the
event that the principal contractor has failed to pay for such services
or materials, and, in addition, the subcontractor has furnished the
D

'This is similar to the agency cases where private instructions are given to

an agent, which are held not to be binding on third parties without notice.
"Siebrecht v. Hogan (1898) 99 Wis. 437, 75 N. W. 71, 73.
Osborn v. Logus (1895) 28 Ore. 302, 42 Pac. 997, 1001.
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owner with proper statutory notice of his claim. 12 The object of the
statute is to provide a ready and available means whereby persons
13
furnishing labor or materials may have adequate security.
Furnishing materials to the contractor is, in effect, furnishing them
to the owner through a duly authorized agent. This gives rise to a
debt against the owner in favor of the subcontractor, which, in turn.
forms the basis for a lien.
Mere knowledge that work is being done or materials furnished
on one's property does not enable the person furnishing the labor
or materials to obtain a lien, since there is no privity between the
owner and the person furnishing the labor or materials. If, in
such a case, a material man furnishes materials to a contractor,
and the contractor fails to pay for them, the owner's property may
not be subjected to a lien therefor. 14 Since the material man is said
to be substituted to the rights of the contractor to the extent of
his claim, he is in no better position than the contractor, who is not
acting in any representative capacity for the owner of the land.
There is no valid debt against the owner in favor of the materialman- ,pon which a statutory lien may be based, although there
may be a quasi-contractual action for the reasonable value of the
improvements on the owner's land.
When the owner of land is a married woman, further considerations are presented. Formerly, a married woman could not
be bound by any contract affecting her real or personal estate, unless
it was executed in the manner prescribed by law. The requirements
for such a contract, with certain exceptions, were the written consent of the husband and privy examination of the wife. If these
formalities were lacking, the contract, as affecting her estate, was
invalid.' 5 Consequently there was no valid debt upon which a
lien could be based. The Court in numerous cases emphasized the
language of the lien statute, which provides for a "lien for the payment of all debts contracted for work done or materials furnished."' 16
Since the married woman was incapable of contracting in such cases,
'Brick Co. v. Pulley (1915) 168 N. C. 371, 84 S. E. 357; Porter v. Long
(1924) 187 N. C. 629, 122 S. E. 483; Clark v. Edwards (1896) 119 N. C. 115,
25 S. E. 794.
Grissom v. Pickett (1886) 98 N. C. 54, 3 S. E. 921.
Weir v. Page (1891) 109 N. C. 220, 13 S. E. 773; Nicholson v. Nichols
(1894) 115 N. C. 200, 20 S. E. 294.
'Flaum v. Wallace (1889) 103 N. C. 296, 9 S. E. 567; Farthingv. Shield3
(1890) 106 N. C. 289, 10 S.E. 998; Loan Assn. v. Black (1896) 119 N. C. 323.
24 S. E. 481; Ball v. Paquits (1905) 140 N. C. 83, 52 S.E. 410.
"'C. S., sec. 2433.
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there could be no debt to support a lien. In Farthing v. Shields,17
the court held that the power of a married woman to charge her real
estate is measured by her power to dispose of the same; hence, if
she had expressly charged the debt on her lands with the written
assent of her husband, it would be of no avail without her privy
examination. A thorough discussion of this may be found in Ball
v. Paqujin'8 and in the cases there cited by Judge Connor.

The law was changed, and these cases were overruled, by the
adoption of a statute in 1901, providing that the section in regard
to mechanics and material mens' liens, ".

.

applies to the

.

property of a married woman when it appears that such building
was built or repaired on her land with her consent or procurement.
In such case she shall be deemed to have contracted for such
improvements."' 19 This new section was held to be constitutional in
Finger v. Hunter,20 thus making it possible to charge a married
woman's property with a lien for labor or materials furnished for
improvements to her real estate without any of the formalities
previously required. The law was further changed by the Martin
Act 2 ' in 1911, which conferred upon married women a complete
capacity to contract with third persons. Since then, she is as free to
deal with third persons for improvements to her land, as if she
were unmarried. Further, it is no longer necessary for a husband
to join with his wife in contracting for such improvements. The
fact that the owner of land is a married woman does not make any
difference, when she is dealing with third parties, as far as the
imposition of mechanics' or material mens' liens is concerned.
In order for a husband to subject the separate property of his
wife to a lien for improvements placed thereon by him, there must
be a contract executed according to the formalities of section 2515
of the Consolidated Statutes. This section provides that, "No contract between a husband and wife made during coverture shall be
valid to affect or charge any part of the real estate of the wife.
unless such contract is in writing and is duly proved as is
required for conveyances of land; and upon the 'examination of
the wife separate and apart from her husband

.

.

.

it shall

appear to the satisfaction of such officer that the wife freely executed
1

'Farthing v. Shields (1890) 106 N. C. 289, 10 S. E. 998.
"Ball v. Paquin (1905) 140 N. C. 83, 52 S. E. 410.
"C. S., sec. 2434.
"Finger v. Hunter (1902) 130 N. C. 529, 41 S. E. 890.
"C. S., sec. 2507.
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such contract. . . ." While the Martin Act and section 2434 of
the Consolidated Statutes abrogated the above formalities in the cases
when a married woman contracts with persons other than her
husband, they did not change the law with respect to the requirements of section 2515, above quoted, in the case where a married
woman contracts with her husband for improvements to her separate
property, and the husband seeks a lien for himself.
In Kearney v. Vann, 22 a husband built on his wife's land under a
contract with her, in which the requirement as to privy examination
of the wife, according to section 2515, was omitted. The husband,
having furnished materials, was attempting to secure a lien on the
wife's land for the amount due on the materials. The wife had
given the husband a note for $700.00 in payment of work and
materials furnished which had not been paid. It was held that the
property of the wife is not liable or subject to a lien for the husband's claim. Section 2434, above quoted, was held not to apply to
contracts between husband and wife. The requirements of section
2515 had not been complied with. Thus the labor and materials
furnished to the separate property of the wife by her husband were
presumed to be a gift.
From the above reasoning, it would seem to follow that the
husband might obtain a lien on his wife's land in the situation where
the wife has contracted with a third party for the improvement of
her land, and such third party has secured materials or labor from
the husband. The husband, as a subcontractor, would be in a better
position than the husband, as a principal contractor. Although no
case involving these identical facts has been found, it would seem
that section 2515 of the Consolidated Statutes applies only to contracts entered into directly between husband and wife, and that the
husband, as a subcontractor, is entitled to a lien under the provisions
of the lien statutes.
If the husband contracts with the wife to repair or build on her
land, and a third person furnishes labor or materials, may such a
subcontractor have a lien on the wife's land in case the husband
fails to pay for the labor or materials? It is clear that the husband
is not able to subject the separate property of his wife to a lien in
his own favor by furnishing labor or materials to improve her
property, unless a contract is executed by the wife in strict compliance with the terms of section 2515.23 What is the effect of this
'Keartey v. Vann (1911)

See preceeding note.

154 N. C. 311, 70 S. E. 747
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section when a third party is seeking to subject the wife's land to
a lien by reason of having furnished labor or materials to the husband, who has contracted with his wife to improve her land? In
other words, is a formal contract between husband and wife
necessary where a third party and not the husband is seeking to
impose a lien?
Looking at the statutes and the cases in North Carolina, the
conclusion seems to be that section 2515 has nothing to do with the
case where a third party is seeking to impose a lien on the wife's
land, but embraces only contracts between husband and wife. 24 As
already discussed, no formal contract is necessary between a land
owner and contractor, to make improvements on the land, in order
that a subcontractor may get a lien. The essential thing is that the
land owner and contractor be in a principal-agent relation.
The reason why the subcontractor is put in a better position than
the husband, in the above instance, is due to the fact that the wife
may consent or procure improvements on her property through her
husband with or without a formal contract. By section 2434 of the
Consolidated Statutes, the general lien law applies to the property
of married women, whenever a wife consents to or procures improvements on her land and "in such case. she shall be deemed to have
contracted for such improvements." Thus by the very words of the
statute, a contractual relationship between the married woman and
the subcontractor is established. This gives rise to a valid debt in
favor of the subcontractor upon which his lien may attach. What
actually happens is that by the consent or procurement of the wife,
the husband is given power, as her agent, to improve her property
by dealing with third persons for work and materials. No formal
contract is needed to establish such an agency, the wife's consent
being sufficient. The lien for labor or materials is thus imposed by
reason of her consent to this agency of her husband. Consequently,
the relation of debtor and creditor between the wife and the subcontractor is established through the husband's acts as agent of the
wife. Consent of the wife to the imposition of the lien is not
material. Neither is it essential that she consent to the particular
improvement or to any particular subcontractor. Her consent is to
the acts of her husband, as her agent, and those acts may lead to
the imposition of a lien on her property by force of the general
lien statutes.
4
Payne v. Flack (1910) 152 N. C. 600, 68 S. E. 16; Rose v. Davis (1924)
188 N. C. 355, 124 S. E. 576; C. S., secs. 2433, 2434.
2
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In Payne v. Flack,25 the wife contracted with her husband for
repairs on her land, and he secured materials from the plaintiff, who
was seeking to enforce a lien. It appeared that the wife had paid
the husband in full for the repair work, before the plaintiff gave
notice of his claim, as required by statute. The court held that the
wife's land was not subject to this lien, Clark, C. J., saying,
"This is not a case of a married woman standing silent when improvements
are being placed on her house, receiving benefits, and then defying the contractor because she had made no valid express contract. In such case, the
statute now makes her property subject to lien, upon the implied contract arising upon her conduct, as it would in regard to any one else under the same
circumstances. But here she paid the contractor in full before receiving notice
from the subcontractors, the material men, and is freed from liability to them
as any one else would be under the same state of facts."

In Rose v. Davis,2 6 the facts of which were stated at the beginning of this note and which are similar to those in Payne v. Flack,

it was also held that the wife's land was not subject to a lien in favor
of the material man, who had dealt with the husband.

The court,

speaking through Judge Stacy, said:
"This conclusion rests, not upon the fact that the property in question is
owned by a married woman, for liens may now be acquired against the property
of married women (C. S. 2434), but it is bottomed on the circumstance of no
(C. S. 2438)
notice to the owner before settlement with the contractor.
Plaintiff seeks to meet this position by saying that, as the contractor was paid
in advance, he had no opportunity of giving any notice to the owner prior to
settlement with the contractor, and hence it should be held that none was
necessary. In answer to this, it is sufficient to say that liens are statutory, and
the statute gives no lien to a subcontractor or laborer in such a case."
The clear inference, in both of the above cases, is that if proper

statutory notice were given, then a lien should attach to the wife's
land in favor of the subcontractor who furnishes' labor or materials

to the husband.
G. H. J.
MANNING v. ATLANTIC AND YADKIN RAILWAY COMPANY-This
1
recent case was of such state wide interest (involving the so-called

"dismemberment" of the old Cape Fear and Yadkin Valley Railroad) that there has been a demand from lawyers as well as laymen
of the state for a concise statement of the facts and the law. The
purpose of this note is to give that statement in brief form, without

attempting any analysis of the authorities followed.
' Payne v. Flack (1910) 152 N. C. 600, 601, 68 S. E. 16.
"Rose v. Davis (1924) 188 N. C. 355, 356, 124 S. E. 576.
'Manning v. Atlantic and Yadkin Railway Co. (1924) 188 N. C. 648, 125
S. E. 555.
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The general opinion was that Attorney General Manning brought
the action in the name of the State to question the authority of the
Atlantic Coast Line Railway Company and the Southern Railway
Company to lease and divide the old Cape Fear and Yadkin Valley
Railway. This is true, but a more intricate and involved set of
facts is found in the history of the case.
In 1852 the General Assembly incorporated the Western Railroad Company which by its charter was authorized to build a
railroad between Fayetteville and the coal regions in Moore and
Chatham Counties.2 The County of Cumberland and the Town
of Fayetteville each subscribed $100,000. Individuals subscribed
$135,000. Under another statute, the State gave more than $600,000 and later, by a bond issue in 1868, subscribed an additional sum
of $500,000.
In 1879 the name of the Western Railway Company was
changed, by authority of the General Assembly, to the Cape Fear
and Yadkin Valley Railway Company, and legally stood in the place
of the old Company. The new Company was also authorized to
consolidate with the Mount Airy Railroad Company and to complete
the roads.3
In 1883 there was a further reorganization of the road by the
General Assembly which authorized further extensions and
branches. 4 Later the South Carolina Pacific Railway running from
Bennettsville, S. C., to the North Carolina line was leased. Thus
the system from Wilmington to Mount Airy with numerous branch
lines was operated by the Cape Fear and Yadkin Valley Railway
Company until its dissolution. The road was valued at over $7,000,000, of which sum the State had donated and subscribed over

$1,000,000.
On June 1, 1886 the Cape Fear and Yadkin Valley Railway
Company executed to the Farmers Loan and Trust Company of
New York as trustee, a deed of trust of all its property and franchise to secure a bond issues of $3,054,000; and on Oct. 1, 1889 it
executed a consolidated mortgage on its property and franchise to
secure an additional bond issue of $1,848,000.
In March, 1894, a default was made in the payment of interest,
and the Farmers Loan and Trust Company brought suit in the
'Laws 1852, ch. 147.
'Pub. Laws 1879, ch. 67.
' Pub. Laws 1883, ch. 190.
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Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of North
Carolina to foreclose the first mortgage.
On the day the bill was filed, John Gill was appointed receiver
of the Cape Fear and Yadkin Valley Railway and took possession
of its property. In the suit, an attempt was made to force a sale
of the property in division and thereby dismember the system, but
the court refused to permit such a sale and ordered the property
sold as an entirety,5 the reason being, among others, that an act,
passed to amend section 698 of the Code, provided that a corporation
created in consequence of a sale or conveyance of corporate property
under a deed of trust should succeed to the franchise rights and
privileges of the first corporation only in case the first corporation
was sold as an entirety.
The case came up for rehearing and later went to the Circuit
Court of Appeals but the decision was affirmed in both cases. 6
The Commissioners appointed! under the decree of the United
States Court sold the property to the officers of the Wilmington
and Western Railroad Company (now Atlantic Coast Line) for
$3,125,000. These officers requested the conveyance to be made to
the Atlantic and Yadkin Railway Company, which was done. Thii
Company was incorporated by the General Assembly and the entire
transaction ratified by an act of February 23, 1899. Thus the
property of the Cape Fear and Yadkin Valley Railway Company
was sold as an "entirety" to the Atlantic and Yadkin Railway
Company pursuant to the decree of the United States Court.
On May 13, 1899, the directors of the Atlantic and Yadkin Railway Company, by deed sold outright that portion of the railroad
between Wilmington and Sanford to the Wilmington and Weldon
Railroad Company. Later the Southern Railway Company acquired
all the stock of the Atlantic and Yadkin Railway Company and so
became the owner of that part of the road running from Sanford
to Mount Airy.
In 1913 the General Assembly passed a resolution, reciting the
alledged dismemberment of the Atlantic and Yadkin Railway and
empowered the Corporation Commission to investigate it. The Corporation Commission did subpoena witnesses and caused the books
and papers of the corporation to be examined but nothing more
was done.
'Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. C. F. & Y. V. Ry. Co. (1897) 82 Fed. 344.

"Low v. Blackford (1898) 87 Fed. 392.
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In 1923 the General Assembly passed a resolution authorizing
the Attorney General to investigate and report the alleged dismemberment without delay, "and institute such action or actions as may
be desirable or necessary to dissolve the alleged illegal dismemberment of said road, in order that it may be restored as a continuous
east and west line as contemplated by the State in the granting of
the original charter." This action was brought in pursuance of
this resolution.
The plaintiff in his complaint alleged substantially as follows:
That the said purchase and dismemberment of the Cape Fear and Yadkin
Valley Railway Company was contrary to law, in that it was conceived in
fraud and for the purpose of evading the decree of the court which authorized
the sale of said property as an entirety.
That it was for the purpose of deceiving and misleading the Legislature
of North Carolina and evading the act of 1897, which made a sale under deed
of trust, contingent on the sale of the property in its entirety.
That it was for the purpose of working a great injury to the people of
North Carolina, and especially those living in the vicinity of the road.
That the said deed of the Atlantic and Yadkin Railway to the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company (now the Atlantic Coast Line) was
fraudulent and contrary to law and therefore void and should be surrendered
and cancelled.
That the property formerly composing the Cape Fear and Yadkin Valley
Railway Company and purchased by the Atlantic and Yadkin Railway Company
should be operated and its franchise enjoyed as an entirety.
To these allegations, the defendant demurred, contending:
That neither the plaintiff nor the State of North Carolina have any interest
in the alleged cause of action.
That the complaint does not allege any facts, showing conspiracy to violate
any law or public policy of the state, any fraud in the purchase or dismemberment of the railroad, the evasion of any acts of the Legislature, or the working
of any injury to the people of the State.
That certain rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission have not been
complied with. Also that certain federal laws, as the Anti-Trust Act, are
involved which would defeat the jurisdiction of the State Court.
That the plaintiff has not shown good faith and due diligence since the
sale of the Cape Fear and Yadkin Valley Railway was confirmed May 3,
1899, and that decree was not questioned until May, 1923, when this action
was instituted. Such gross laches should estop the plaintiff from maintaining
this action.

That since the foreclosure sale of the Cape Fear and Yadkin Valley Rail-

way was in strict conformity to the decree of the Circuit Court of the United
States, the said property was legally vested in the said purchasers and their
successors in title, and that the rights of bondholders and other third parties
are now involved.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Of the contentions involving federal questions, the court refused
to consider any of them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The demurrer of the defendants was sustained, first, on the
ground that the sale by the Atlantic and Yadkin Railway Company
to the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company was authorized
by law and was therefore valid.
By the Private Laws of 1899, Chap. 98, sec. 6, the Atlantic and
Yadkin Railway Company was authorized to consolidate with any
other railroad company organized under the laws of the State on
such conditions as might be agreed upon by and between the stockholders of the said companies. The court decided that, by virtue
of this act, the first company had the power to sell and the second
company had the power to purchase. They held that this statute
must be construed according to the intention of the Legislature and
not as to popular meaning. "The Legislature was presumed to know
the facts, and, since it authorized the sale in question, its intention
to do so must be conclusively presumed."17 The fact that all the
leases, mergers, and sales were not specifically authorized by amendments to the charters of the railroads made no difference. "The
important thing is the grant of power, not the mode in which the
8
power was granted."
As to the allegations of fraud, the Court held that they were
merely general allegations and not specific enough to be considered.
Fraud could not be inferred when not specifically alleged. The
demurrers did not admit fraud because the complaint did not show it.
The second proposition decided by the Court was that the
plaintiff was estopped by laches to prosecute the action.
They held that the ancient maxim "Nullum tempus occurrit
regi" obtains with us only in exceptional cases. As a main proposition of law, C. S. 420 was quoted "The limitations prescribed by
law apply to civil actions brought in the name of the State or for its
benefit in the same manner as to actions by or for the benefit of
private parties." The court held this to be the law in this State in
the absence of a specific statute to the contrary in a particular case.
The plaintiff contended that the doctrine of laches as administered by courts of equity was anagalous to statutes of limitations
and that the defendants' misuser, nonuser and usurpation of corporate powers constituted a continuing cause of action to which no
statute of limitations could apply.
"188 N. C. 648, 660.
9188 N. C.648, 660.
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The Court held contrary; that "independently of the statute of
limitations, the doctrine of laches has existed since the beginning
of equity jurisdiction. It rests on the principle that nothing can
call into exercise the powers of a court of chancery but conscience,
good faith and reasonable diligence."0
A quarter of a century had elapsed since the dismemberment
took place, and the court held that this was sufficient time to bar the
plaintiff from maintaining the action, on the grounds, that a failure
to bring the action before constituted gross laches. How long a time
would be sufficient to bar the action was not considered by the
court, but it held that "each case is to be determined according to
its own peculiar circumstances and the question of laches is addressed
0
to the sound discretion of the Chancellor."'
Mr. Justice Clarkson concurred in the result solely on the
grounds of "laches," thinking that to overturn the dismemberment would work too great a hardship on innocent purchasers and
bondholders."
W. T. H.
MORTGAGEE'S INTEREST IN INSURANCE POLICY UNDER STANDARD

customary whenever a mortgage is placed
on real estate for the owner to take out insurance in which he is the
beneficiary; and then to protect the mortgagee, by attaching to the
policy the standard mortgage clause. The effect of this "rider" is to
protect the mortgagee to the extent of his interest. No act or omission -by the mortgagor, unknown to the mortgagee, can affect the
mortgagee's interest in the insurance contract. In a recent North
Carolina case,' the mortgagor sold the insured property, contrary
to a clause in the policy providing that, "If any change, other than
by death of the insured, takes place in the . . . title
of the subject of the insurance . . . This Company is not liable
for damage or loss occurring." The Court said, in regard to the
right of the mortgagee under the standard mortgage clause, "It is a
generally accepted position that this clause operates as a separate and
distinct insurance of the mortgagee's interest, to the extent at least
of not being invalidated by any act or omission on the part of the
owner or mortgagor, unknown to the mortgagee; and according to
MORTGAGE CLAUSE-It is

' 188 N. C. 648, 665.
18 188 N. C. 648, 665.
188 N. C. 648, 667.
'Bank v. Assurance Co. (1924) 188 N. C. 747, 125 S. E. 631.
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the clear weight of authority this affords protection against the
'2
previous as well as the subsequent acts of the mortgagor or assured."
The standard mortgage clause is almost universally held to act as an
independant contract between the insurer and mortgagee.3 Therefore if the mortgagor does any act whatever which will breach his
contract of insurance with the company because of a condition in
his policy, such as, misrepresenting his ownership in the insured
property, 4 increasing the fire risk, failing to pay premiums, 5 or, as
in the above case, conveying away his title in the insured property, 6
it will not prevent the mortgagee from recovering in case of loss.
If the ownership changes with the mortgagee's knowledge, then
he cannot recover unless he notifies the company of such change,
because of a provision in the standard mortgage clause which says,
"The mortgagee or trustee must notify this Company of any change
of ownership

.

.

.

' '7

which shall come to the knowledge of the

mortgagee or trustee.
In Bank v. Assurance Company,8 Stacy J., presented the following quaere, "Whether the original parties to the contract could have
canceled or rescinded the entire policy including the standard
mortgage clause without the consent of the mortgagee or trustee
mentioned therein." The North Carolina court has rendered no
decision on this point but cited two cases relative to it. The first
was an Iowa case 9 in which the Court held that where a third person
by agreement in writing with a mortgagor, agreed to settle and discharge the mortgage debt when it became due, that he might, at any
time before the mortgagee assented to and accepted such arrangement, cancel the same and be relieved of any liability because of his
promise to pay such debt. In a Wisconsin case, 10 under facts similar
to those in the Iowa case, except that the mortgagee assented to the
arrangement by which a third party undertook to pay the mortgage
'188 N. C. 747, 751.
'Hastings v. Insurance Co. (1878) 73 N. Y. 141; Reed v. Fireman's Ins.
Co. (1911) 81 N. J. L. 523, 80 At. 462; Eddy v. London Assur. Co. (1894)
143 N. Y. 311; Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Boston et al. (1894) 65 Fed. 165.
"State Ins. Co. v. Trust Co. (1896) 47 Neb. 62, 66 N. W. 9 (false statement
as to incumbrances).
Francisv. Buttler Fire Insur. Co. 7 R. I. 159.
'Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Trust Co. (1894) 41 Neb. 834, 60 N. W. 133, 25 L.
R. A. 679.
Continental Insurance Co. v. Anderson (1899) 107 Ga. 541, 33 S. E. 887;
Cole v. Germania Ins. Co. (1885) 99 N. Y. 36, 1 N. E. 38.
(1924) 188 N. C. 747, 754.
"Gilbert v. Sanderson (1881) 56 Iowa 349, 9 N. W. 293, 41 Am. Rep. 103.
10Basset v. Hughes (1877) 43 Wis. 319.
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debt, the Court said that after knowledge of and assent to the new
arrangement by the mortgagee, nothing that the original parties may
do can affect his right of action on the new contract. These are the
only cases cited as -bearing on the question. It is evident that they
are not directly in point, as they do not deal with insurance contracts
or questions arising under the standard policy relative to cancellation.
There seems to be one case in point in Maine, where A mortgaged
his property to B and took out insurance with the defendant Company, attaching a standard mortgage clause in favor of B. Later B
took possession of the property as mortgagee, and A canceled the
insurance policy without B's knowledge. The Court held that B
could recover from the Insurance Company and that the cancellation
as to B was invalid.'1 In support of its decision, the Court cited a
number of cases all holding that no act or breach of the contract by
the insured could effect the interest of the mortgagee. The Court
also contends that the provision in the standard mortgage clause
stating that in order to cancel, the Insurance Company must give the
mortgagee and the insured ten days notice, sustains their holding,
since no notice was given to the mortgagee. There is a very strong
dissenting opinion in this case, which claims that the cases cited
are not in point, and also that the insurance policy expressly says
that the insured may cancel at will and does not mention the mortgagee. Therefore the provision in the standard mortgage clause
saying that the Company in order to cancel, must give ten days notice
to the insured and the mortgagee, is not applicable, because in the
case at bar, the insured and not the Company canceled the policy.
The dissenting opinion concluded that the insured had the power to
cancel and thereby defeat the mortgagee's interest in the policy.
A Michigan case 12 adds an interesting phase to the situation. It
was there held, that although the insured may have a legal right
to cancel the policy he-had taken out for a surety's protection, he
had no equitable right to do so, and that the surety had an equitable
interest (measured by his interest in the first policy) in a second
policy taken out after the cancellation, in which a third party was
made the beneficiary. It seems that if there had been no second
policy the surety's right against the Insurance Company would have
been defeated because the Court goes on the premise that the insured
u Gilman v. Ins. Co. (1914) 112 Me. 528, 92 At. 721.
"Miller v. Aldrich (1875) 31 Mich. 408.
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had a legal right to cancel; therefore this case is in accord with the
dissent in the Maine case, in so far as the legal right of the insured
to cancel is involved.
In conclusion, a Maine decision directly in point with the question
presented by Stacy J., holds that the insured could not cancel and
thus deprive the mortgagee of his interest in the policy, but there is
a strong dissent which is based oh sound reasoning, supported by
the Michigan case which holds that the insured has a legal right to
cancel but no equitable right to do so. The cases that the North
Carolina Court cited relative to this quaere, if followed, intimate
that it would hold that the insured could not cancel his policy without
the consent of the mortgagee. However, if the case actually arose,
an opposite result is altogether possible.
C. B. M.
RECENT TYPES OF ADmINISTRATIvE ACTION IN NORTH CARoState Highway Commission-Chapter 2 of the Public
Laws of 1921 created the State Highway Commission and empowered it to carry out the provisions of the act; namely, the construction
of a state system of highways. The Commission was to consist
of a State Highway Commissioner and nine commissioners, one from
each construction district, to be appointed by the Governor with the
confirmation of the Senate. When not in session, the State Highway Commissioner is vested with the powers of the Commission.
In general, it is authorized to take over any road and "widen,
relocate, change or alter the grade or location" of it.' A map is
attached to the bill showing the proposed roads to be taken over
for the state highway system. But it is provided that the Commission "may change, alter, add to or discontinue the roads so shown
provided no roads shall be changed altered or discontinued so as to
disconnect county-seats, principal towns, state or national parks or
forest reserves, principal state institutions and highway systems of
other states".2 Other powers incidental to carrying out the provisions
of the act are specifically granted, and the Commission furthermore
is given "power and authority to make rules and regulations for
3
carrying out the true intent and purposes of this act".
The map attached to the bill showed a highway from Durham
to Oxford, county-seats, through Stem. The Highway Commission
LINA-(1)

1

Pub. Laws of 1921, Chap. 2, see. 10 (b).
' Pub. Laws of 1921, Chap. 2, sec. 7.
'Pub. Laws of 1921, Chap. 2, sec. 4, sec. 10.
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after investigation and hearings, decided to construct the road from
Durham to Oxford through Creedmoor. Plaintiff sought to enjoin
the Commission from constructing the road through Creedmoor, and
the Court denied the injunction. 4 Adams, J., delivering the opinion
of the Court, says that the action of the Commission may not be
controlled by the court unless there is an abuse of discretion, as long
as the Commission keeps within the limits of the powers granted
it by the legislature. But the power of the Commission to change
or discontinue roads is limited by the proviso that they shall not disconnect county-seats, principal towns, etc. He holds that the question of what is a principal town is a question for judicial determination, and the Court finds that Stem is not a principal town within
the meaning of the act and therefore upholds the Highway Commission. Stacy, J., concurring in the result, says that what are principal towns is to be determined by the Commission exercising sound
but not arbitrary judgment and subject to judicial review only in
cases of abuse of discretion. Clarkson, J., dissenting, says that the
principal towns referred to in the act are those shown on the map
and that under no circumstances may a road disconnect these.
Besides the powers referred to above, the Commission is given
other broad powers in relation to construction, letting of contracts,
taking over roads, acquiring materials, enforcing legal rights, regulation of use of highways, establishing traffic census bureaus, maintenance of highways, naming and making the roads, beautifying them,
and securing federal aid in construction. 5
In case of taking over a road, the Commission must give notice
and if objection is made, the Commission hears the objection under
rules and regulations laid down by it for governing the proceedings,
and determines the most practical and desirable route. Their decision
is final. 6
It is thus obvious that the Highway Commission is an administrative body similar in many respects to the Corporation Commission.
Indeed in the first case that arose, Road Commissioners v. Highway
Commission,7 Clark, C. J., says, "Furthermore, in a broad view, the
state in the construction of these highways is acting through an administrative body". The act creating the Highway Commission did
not as in the case of the Corporation Commission provide for judicial
'Cameron v. State Highway Commission (1924) 188 N. C. 84, 123 S. E. 465.
'Pub. Laws of 1921, Chap. 2, sec. 10.
'Pub. Laws of 1921, Chap. 2, sec. 7.
'Road Commission v. Highway Commission (1923)
,

886.

185 N. C. 56, 115 S. E.
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review. The Supreme Court seems to hold that if the Highway
Commission keeps within the scope of the powers granted, the
Court may interfere only in case of abuse of discretion, that is,
unreasonable action.
(2) Corporation Commission--Bank Examiners-The Corporation Commission was given authority to appoint bank examiners
whose duties were to make examination of banks.3 The examiners
were given the power to take possession of banks for purpose of making a thorough examination. They might compel attendance and
examine under oath officers, directors, stockholders and individuals
in regard to the affairs of the bank. If they found the bank in an
unsafe condition the Corporation Commission might authorize the
bank examiners, upon giving bond, to take possession of the property of the bank until the Corporation Commission received and acted
upon the report of the examiner. The Commission might then
apply for appointment of a receiver or it might grant the bank 60
days to make good the deficiency or loss. 9 The examiner also has
the power to arrest without a warrant any officer guilty of a violation of the criminal laws relating to banks and banking and to hold
him until a warrant can be served.' 0
In 1921 a new banking law was adopted" re-enacting to some
extent the powers of the Corporation Commission and giving it
greater power in regard to banks. Among other things- it provides
that the Commission may take possession of the business and property of any bank to which this act is applicable when it has violated
its charter, is conducting business in an unauthorized or unsafe
manner, has an impairment of capital stock and other like cases.
Such banks may with the consent of the Corporation Commission
resume business upon such terms and conditions as may be approved
by

it.12

It

further provides that

".....

it shall be its duty

(Corporation Commission's) to execute and enforce through the
Chief State Bank Examiner, the State Bank Examiners and such
relating to banks as
all laws .......
other agents .......
1
Statutes
Consolidated
of
the
The sections
defined by this act."'
14
re-enacted.
virtually
are
above mentioned
8

C. S., sec. 249.
'C. S., sec. 250, 253.
C. S., sec. 254.
Pub.
Pub.
"Pub.
mPub.

Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws

of 1921,
of 1921,
of 1921,
of 1921,

Chap. 4.
Chap. 4, sec. 16.
Chap. 4, sec. 63.
Chap. 4, sdcs. 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78.
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In the case of Taylor v. Everett,15 the State Bank Examiner,
having made an audit of the People's Bank, found that there was an
impairment of its capital stock. This is one of the cases in which the
Corporation Commission may take possession of the bank, and it has
authority to allow the bank to resume business upon such conditions
as it may provide. The directors agreed to comply with the conditions
laid down by the State Bank Examiner, whereupon he allowed them
to continue business. A question arose as to the liability of the directors on the contract to one who was subrogated to the rights of the
bank as beneficiary of the contract. They were held liable. In
delivering the opinion, Connor, J., says, "A condition thus existed
under which the State Bank Examiner, acting under the authority
of the Corporation Commission, was empowered by law to take
possession of the business and property of the People's Bank and to
determine upon what terms and conditions it might resume business
.....
the Commission or the bank examiner acting under its
authority, instead of first taking possession of the bank and thus
dosing it, may impose terms and conditions upon which the bank
may continue business. . .... 1
It does not clearly appear whether the conditions were imposed
by the Corporation Commission or the State Bank Examiner acting
under authority from the Corporation Commission. But from an
examination of the facts and opinion it is probable that they were
imposed by the Chief State Bank Examiner. The case speaks of a
letter from the State Bank Examiner in which he stated the terms
upon which the Bank might resume business. If this is correct it
seems to be a reasonable conclusion from the case that the Bank
Examiner, acting under his general authority, but without the
express direction or approval of the Corporation Commission, has
power to impose conditions upon which a bank may continue or
resume business.
What is the practice in regard to the imposition of these conditions is not known. It may be that the Bank Examiner has the
conditions approved by the Corporation Commission before they are
offered to the bank. It would appear, however, from a careful reading of the case that the Commission authorizes the state bank exami-'
ners to impose such conditions as are needed. Thus the Bank deals
directly with the Bank Examiner and not with the Corporation Com' Taylor v. Everett et al. (1924) 188 N. C. 247, 124 S. E. 316. See also
Trust Co. v. Burke (1924) 189 N. C. 69, 126 S.E. 163.
1 188 N. C. 247, 259.
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mission. The Court in Taylor v. Everett intimates that this procedure
is valid. This would seem to be a very practical way of dealing with
the problem. The Examiner is an expert in the affairs of banks.
The Corporation Commisson does not profess to be. He is the one
who understands most clearly the affairs of the bank, having made
the examination; therefore he is better qualified to say what are just
conditions. Immediate action may be necessary and the delay in referring to the Commission might cause further complications. Suppose, however, the bank should object to the conditions imposed by
the examiners and appeal to, the Commission. It seems quite clear
that the action of the Commission would control, as the power to
impose the conditions is vested in the Corporation Commission by
the statute. The statute further says that the Commission shall enforce the law "through the Chief State Bank Examiner, the State
bank examiners and such other agents-- '1 7 thereby treating the bank

examiners merely as agents of the Commission.
The two cases discussed illustrate the modern tendency of the
courts to uphold administrative action where it is reasonable.18 A
statement of Justice Stacy in Cameron v. Highway Commission will
illustrate this. He says, "Road building is not a matter of drawing
lines upon a map; it partakes of scientific rather than legislative or
judicial engineering."' 19 It seems settled that the court will review
the action of the Highway Commission only in case of abuse of discretion or exceeding their authority. As to the Corporation Commission, while there may be an appeal in certain cases so as to obtain
a trial de novo in the Superior Court,20 the decision of the Commis-

' t Pub. Laws of 1921, Chap. 4, sec. 63.
'Roumfort Co. v. Delaney (1911) 230 Pa. 377, 79 Atl. 653 (upholding
action of Factory Inspector in requiring alterations in factory for fire protection) ; Cockroft v. Mitchell et al. (N. Y. 1919) 187 App. Div. 190 (upholding order of Industrial Commission requiring additional means of exit in 16
story building used for manufacturing) ; Borgnis v. Falk Co. (1911) 147 Wis.
327, 133 N. W. 209 (upholding action of Workmen's Compensation Board);
Mutual Film Co. v. Ohio Industrial Commission (1915) 236 U. S. 230 (upholding moving picture censorship) ; Intermountain Rate Cases (1914) 234 U. S.
476 (upholding power of Interstate Commerce Commission) ; Hocking Valley
Railway Co. v. Public Utilities Coin. (1915) 92 Ohio St. 9, 110 N. E. 521
(upholding action of Public Utilities Commission). There are many more
cases similar to the above. See Labor Law Administration in Pennsylvania by
Robert H. Wettach (1922) 70 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 277 for cases involving administrative action in industry.
188 N. C. 84, 90.
Commission v. Railroad (1912) 161 N. C. 270, 271, 76 S. E. 554; see
article by Charles L. Nichols, Judicial Review of North Carolina Corporation
Commission (1924) 2 N. C. L. Rev. 69, 78.
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sion is given great weight and presumed prima facie to be correct. 21
In a great majority of the cases, their action is also upheld unless it
is unreasonable. 22 The power allowed bank examiners acting under
the Corporation Commission is another illustration of the liberal
view of the powers of administrative bodies. No more do the courts
discuss the objection to administrative bodies that they are unconstitutional because of a delegation of legislative power or because
they violate the doctrine of separation of powers. 23 They are a very
efficient and, you might even say, indispensable means of administering law. Whatever may be the theories, government through administrative tribunals has worked and will undoubtedly continue to
expand to wider fields.
C. W. P.

"C. S., sec. 1098.
"See discussion in Mr. Nichol's article, 2 N. C. L. Rev. 69, 80.
"2 N. C. L. Rev. 69, 72, discussing Express Co. v. Railroad Co. (1892) 111
N. C. 463, 16 S. E. 393; Filn Corporation v. Industrial Cominnission (1914)
236 U S. 230, 245; Interinountain Rate Cases (1914) 234 U. S. 476, 486.

